The European art of governing. The tension between collegiality and national interests in the Cabinets of the European Commissioners

Abstract

ABSTRACT To explore what we call the ‘European art of governing’, this article examines the Cabinets of the members of the European Commission. They function at the interface between levels and modes of governance, between the Commission and Member State governments, between national interests (of capitals) and sectoral interests (their portfolios). A new interpretation of the ‘denationalization’ process is given, focusing more on profiles than on practices. Cabinets have been remarkably stable since the end of the 1960s in their role as conduits of collegiality. However they also reflect a new form of ‘intergovernmentalization’ of the Commission. Using a historical and sociological approach, the article shows how collegiality at the Commission has been exercised since the Delors period of presidentialization and Juncker’s introduction of real Vice-Presidents, generating complex forms of competition between horizontal and vertical coordination processes.