{"title":"Are citizens responsible for global wrongs?","authors":"A. Stilz","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2022.2075149","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay critically assesses Christine Hobden’s argument in Citizenship in a Globalised World that democratic citizenship is an important vehicle for the attainment of global justice. The first section examines Hobden’s claim that cosmopolitan consequentialism justifies citizenship in separate states. I argue that for this argument to succeed, it needs to elaborate a connection between relational equality for individuals and the self-determination of political groups. The second section scrutinizes Hobden’s account of the collective culpability of a democratic citizenry for their state’s wrongful actions. I argue that it is difficult to make sense of collective culpability: we are better off focusing on the personal culpability of individuals for contributing to collective wrongs.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2075149","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACT This essay critically assesses Christine Hobden’s argument in Citizenship in a Globalised World that democratic citizenship is an important vehicle for the attainment of global justice. The first section examines Hobden’s claim that cosmopolitan consequentialism justifies citizenship in separate states. I argue that for this argument to succeed, it needs to elaborate a connection between relational equality for individuals and the self-determination of political groups. The second section scrutinizes Hobden’s account of the collective culpability of a democratic citizenry for their state’s wrongful actions. I argue that it is difficult to make sense of collective culpability: we are better off focusing on the personal culpability of individuals for contributing to collective wrongs.