Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

IF 0.6 4区社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-09-18 DOI:10.1177/0951629819875516

Yasushi Asako

引用次数: 3

Abstract

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72

查看原文本刊更多论文

策略性歧义与概率投票

政党和候选人通常喜欢做出模棱两可的承诺。在给定选民凸效用函数的条件下，本文确定了候选人在均衡中选择模棱两可承诺的条件。结果表明，在确定性模型中，当投票者具有凸效用函数时，不存在均衡。然而，在概率投票模型中，当(i)选民具有凸效用函数，(ii)选民最喜欢的政策分布两极分化时，候选人在均衡中做出模棱两可的承诺。JEL分类:D71、D72

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.