The British Army, Upper Silesia, and European Diplomacy, 1920–22

Abstract

ABSTRACT At the end of the First World War, Britain was at the limit of its capabilities, both militarily and diplomatically. Despite large reductions in the size of its armed forces, it had an increasing number of responsibilities as a victorious power. One of these responsibilities was to ensure the success of a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. It had little desire to do this but was compelled to provide support in order to counter French influence in the region, having to do so with minimal expertise and manpower. This article explores the decision-making which occurred in relation to the British role in Upper Silesia, placing it within the wider context of British strategic and diplomatic policy in the years immediately after the First World War, while also assessing the use (or not) of British civilian and military experts on the ground. Belatedly taking a role in the region certainly helped to aid a situation which was spiralling out of control, but highlights how a short-term outlook on foreign policy and decision-making hindered British efforts to exert influence in the region and further afield.