Free Agency for the Front Office: How Data Analytics and Noncompete Agreements Threaten to Disrupt Competitive Balance in U.S. Professional Sports Leagues

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 BUSINESS
Nathaniel Grow
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

U.S. professional sports teams are increasingly relying on sophisticated forms of data analysis to identify potential areas of competitive advantage over their league rivals. Indeed, emerging evidence suggests that the most sophisticated teams in this area are using the insights that they derive from data analytics to establish durable and significant gains over their competition on the playing field. At the same time, sports franchises frequently utilize noncompete agreements to protect the resulting, proprietary information that their data analysis yields. Unfortunately, recent academic research suggests that this reliance on covenants not to compete can decrease the rate of knowledge diffusion within an industry, making it more difficult for teams to catch up to early adopters of data analytics. Thus, teams’ growing reliance on data analytics—and their use of noncompete agreements to protect their resulting findings—could have significant, but heretofore unrecognized, ramifications for league efforts to maintain an adequate level of competitive balance amongst their franchises. This article explores this state of affairs, as well as the implications it presents for the governance of U.S. professional sports leagues.

前台的自由市场:数据分析和竞业禁止协议如何威胁破坏美国职业体育联盟的竞争平衡
美国职业运动队越来越依赖于复杂形式的数据分析,以确定相对于联盟对手的潜在竞争优势。事实上,新出现的证据表明,这一领域最成熟的团队正在利用他们从数据分析中获得的洞察力,在竞争中获得持久而显著的收益。与此同时,体育特许经营权经常利用竞业禁止协议来保护数据分析产生的专有信息。不幸的是,最近的学术研究表明,这种对不竞争契约的依赖会降低行业内知识传播的速度,使团队更难以赶上数据分析的早期采用者。因此,球队对数据分析的日益依赖——以及他们使用竞业禁止协议来保护他们的研究结果——可能会对联盟维持其特许经营之间竞争平衡的努力产生重大影响,但迄今为止尚未认识到这一点。本文探讨了这种状况,以及它对美国职业体育联盟治理的影响。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
16.70%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The ABLJ is a faculty-edited, double blind peer reviewed journal, continuously published since 1963. Our mission is to publish only top quality law review articles that make a scholarly contribution to all areas of law that impact business theory and practice. We search for those articles that articulate a novel research question and make a meaningful contribution directly relevant to scholars and practitioners of business law. The blind peer review process means legal scholars well-versed in the relevant specialty area have determined selected articles are original, thorough, important, and timely. Faculty editors assure the authors’ contribution to scholarship is evident. We aim to elevate legal scholarship and inform responsible business decisions.
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