Legalized rent-seeking: Eminent domain in Kazakhstan

IF 0.2 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
M. Hanson
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Kazakhstan ranks consistently low on measures of property rights protection and the rule of law more generally.1 Echoing these evaluations, existing literature emphasizes the degree to which informal institutions shape property relations in personalist, authoritarian regimes, like Kazakhstan. The expectation is that formal institutions like law and courts fail to restrain or otherwise influence state agents’ rent-seeking behavior. In effect, they serve primarily as ornamentation. Regardless, these explanations fail to explain why both citizens and the State regularly turn to these institutions to settle property disputes. This Article focuses on conflicts over eminent domain and finds that in these cases the law provides lower and upper bounds for officials’ rent-seeking behavior. Within these limits, law combines with informal practices to determine legal outcomes. Although the law and courts sometimes provide citizens with opportunities for limited redress, they also help facilitate and legitimize officials’ use of eminent domain for personal enrichment.
合法的寻租:哈萨克斯坦的土地征用权
哈萨克斯坦在产权保护和法治方面的总体排名一直较低。1与这些评价相呼应,现有文献强调了非正式制度在多大程度上塑造了像哈萨克斯坦这样的个人专制政权的财产关系。人们的期望是,像法律和法院这样的正式机构无法约束或以其他方式影响国家代理人的寻租行为。实际上,它们主要用作装饰。无论如何,这些解释并不能解释为什么公民和国家都经常求助于这些机构来解决财产纠纷。本文着重研究了土地征用权的冲突,发现在这些情况下,法律为官员的寻租行为提供了下限和上限。在这些限制范围内,法律与非正式做法相结合,以确定法律结果。尽管法律和法院有时为公民提供有限补救的机会,但它们也有助于为官员利用征用权谋取私利提供便利并使其合法化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Founded in 1967, the Cornell International Law Journal is one of the oldest and most prominent international law journals in the country. Three times a year, the Journal publishes scholarship that reflects the sweeping changes that are taking place in public and private international law. Two of the issues feature articles by legal scholars, practitioners, and participants in international politics as well as student-written notes. The third issue is dedicated to publishing papers generated by the Journal"s annual Symposium, held every spring in Ithaca, New York.
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