Italian diplomacy and the Ukrainian crisis: the challenges (and cost) of continuity

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article seeks to analyse the Italian diplomatic response to the Ukrainian crisis. To this end, the article relies on role theory to understand how Italy’s diplomatic posture during the war was influenced by the expectations deriving from its EU and NATO membership, but also by the different role conceptions emerging in the public debate. Though Italy under its Prime Minister, Mario Draghi, not only responded to but effectively led European strategy towards Ukraine during the crisis – including supporting Ukraine’s membership bid – on the internal front the country was polarized, unwilling to push for further punishment of Russia in view of its economic reverberations, but also questioning military involvement in the war in Ukraine. After a failed attempt to reconcile external expectations and domestic preferences, centred around Italy’s sponsorship of a ‘peace plan’ for Ukraine, the tension between the two sets of influences intensified to the point of precipitating the end of the Draghi government in July 2022, with Italy’s response to the Ukrainian crisis invoked as one of the main causes of the government’s fall. Although the right-wing alliance of political parties that won the ensuing general elections campaigned on a populist and nationalist, ‘Italy first’, platform, the country’s posture towards the war in Ukraine has not really changed – under its current Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, Italy has continued to align with the multilateral expectations set by the EU and the US. The differences in foreign policy outlook within the current governing coalition, however, are not insignificant, and public opinion continues to be divided. This suggests that the tension underlying Italy’s foreign policy in the Ukraine crisis has not been resolved – in fact, it could still potentially undermine the country’s diplomatic posture, as well as the government’s own stability, in the months to come.