Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral Obligation

Abstract

Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via athreat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principlethat "ought" implies "can". Haji's argument requires not only that weembrace an "ought" implies "can" principle, but also that we adopt theprinciple that "ought" implies "able not to". I argue that we havelittle reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deonticmorality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced"ought" implies "can" principle alone. I argue that despite what looklike initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weakerconclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actuallyhave good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moraldeliberation at all.