Mexican sub-federal governments and trade politics: Variation on supportive conditions and institutional resources

Abstract

ABSTRACT Mexico has one of the largest networks of trade and investment agreements in the world. However, the legal architecture in Mexico does not allow sub-federal governments (SGFs) to participate in free trade negotiations. While this explains the rather weak role of Mexican sub-federal units in trade politics, this case study shows that the states are not absent from trade. They utilize semi-formal and informal resources which account for variation in trade engagement. Permissive secondary legislation, cooperation agreements and projects, and intergovernmental bargaining are all institutional resources used by Mexican SFGs to engage in trade politics. These resources function under supportive conditions that facilitate trade, such as interest identification, institutional capacities, and learning processes. A variation of such conditions sets the basis for the use of certain resources. This article presents empirical evidence of SFGs differentiated engagement in the United States-Mexico-Canada agreement (USMCA) and the revamped Mexico-European Union trade agreement (MEX-EU).