Design Principles of Common Property Institutions: The Case of Farmer Cooperatives in the Upper West Region of Ghana

Abstract

Common property institutions in natural resource management are often analysed by means of Ostrom’s framework of design principles. Recently, the design principles have been generalised to study human groups in other collective action scenarios, including farm producers who collectively buy inputs or sell outputs. Several case studies have conceptualised farmer cooperatives as common property institutions to study how various collective action scenarios have been approached. We contribute to the scarce literature with a field study in the Upper West Region of Ghana, using Ostrom’s framework to compare the design principles of active and inactive farmer cooperatives. Using the mean group comparison method, we find numerous significant differences as active farmer cooperatives have clearer boundaries, require more capital investments, have more active board directors and managers, receive more governmental support, and have more locations. However, not all design principles are significantly different for active and inactive cooperatives (e.g. sanctions, legal rights). Considering our results, we perceive opportunities to formalise the conceptualisation of farmer cooperatives as common property institutions with both internal and external design principles. Our results also have policy implications in terms of top-down initiatives to spur collective action by Ghanaian farm producers.