Game analysis of social capital violations and government regulation in public–private partnership risk sharing

IF 1.6 3区工程技术 Q4 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

Systems Engineering Pub Date : 2023-01-11 DOI:10.1002/sys.21657

Yan Li, Xinyu Wang

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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The public–private partnership (PPP) mode entails a variety of risks because the government, private enterprises, financial institutions, and other participants have different interests. To prevent private enterprise violations, dynamic government regulation of PPP risk‐sharing is necessary. Game theory is used here to examine the game behavior of government regulators, private enterprises, intermediary agencies, and the public in the stage of tracking management after the initial risk‐sharing of the project. Primarily, this study analyzes whether private enterprises provide fully compliant reporting and whether government departments check the information by investigating the behavioral motivations behind strategic choices. The primary contribution of this study was to construct a game model of government due diligence inspection under the condition of public participation in regulation. The results of simulations revealed the behavioral characteristics and stability of the participants of PPP in terms of decision‐making. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis between the state variables and several auxiliary variables was used to reveal the internal relationships of the participants’ strategic choices. This paper offers new insights into reducing violation behavior, protecting the public interest from harm, reducing government departments’ regulatory costs, and promoting effective regulation with public participation.

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公私合作风险分担中社会资本违规与政府监管的博弈分析

由于政府、私营企业、金融机构和其他参与者的利益不同，PPP模式带来了各种风险。为了防止私营企业违规，政府对PPP风险分担的动态监管是必要的。本文运用博弈论来考察政府监管机构、私营企业、中介机构和公众在项目初始风险分担后跟踪管理阶段的博弈行为。本研究主要通过调查战略选择背后的行为动机，分析民营企业是否提供了完全合规的报告，以及政府部门是否核查了信息。本研究的主要贡献在于构建了公众参与监管条件下政府尽职审查的博弈模型。模拟结果揭示了PPP参与者在决策方面的行为特征和稳定性。通过状态变量与辅助变量之间的敏感性分析，揭示了参与者战略选择的内在关系。本文为减少违规行为、保护公共利益不受损害、降低政府部门监管成本、促进公众参与的有效监管提供了新的见解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Systems Engineering 工程技术-工程：工业

CiteScore

5.10

自引率

20.00%

发文量

审稿时长

6 months

期刊介绍： Systems Engineering is a discipline whose responsibility it is to create and operate technologically enabled systems that satisfy stakeholder needs throughout their life cycle. Systems engineers reduce ambiguity by clearly defining stakeholder needs and customer requirements, they focus creativity by developing a system’s architecture and design and they manage the system’s complexity over time. Considerations taken into account by systems engineers include, among others, quality, cost and schedule, risk and opportunity under uncertainty, manufacturing and realization, performance and safety during operations, training and support, as well as disposal and recycling at the end of life. The journal welcomes original submissions in the field of Systems Engineering as defined above, but also encourages contributions that take an even broader perspective including the design and operation of systems-of-systems, the application of Systems Engineering to enterprises and complex socio-technical systems, the identification, selection and development of systems engineers as well as the evolution of systems and systems-of-systems over their entire lifecycle. Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty groups into a coordinated team effort forming a structured development process that proceeds from concept to realization to operation. Increasingly important topics in Systems Engineering include the role of executable languages and models of systems, the concurrent use of physical and virtual prototyping, as well as the deployment of agile processes. Systems Engineering considers both the business and the technical needs of all stakeholders with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user needs. Systems Engineering may be applied not only to products and services in the private sector but also to public infrastructures and socio-technical systems whose precise boundaries are often challenging to define.