Parental Caregivers and Household Power Dynamics

Abstract

Do parental caregivers bear the entire cost of caregiving? Standard cooperative models of the household suggest the welfare burden of care would be distributed across household members (for example, husband and wife). This study develops a simple collective model of intrahousehold bargaining to analyze the time and resource allocation decisions associated with providing unpaid care to an elderly parent. The study argues that if bargaining power is endogenously determined or labor markets are rigid, the welfare cost of caregiving can fall disproportionately on the woman partner, resulting in a “triple burden” of market work, home production, and caregiving, in addition to higher levels of unmet care needs. The study provides a numerical example using cross-country European data to demonstrate how a decrease in an adult daughter's bargaining power relative to her partner can increase her share of the welfare burden and the unmet care needs of her parent. HIGHLIGHTS Intrahousehold bargaining determines the welfare costs of unpaid caregiving. Labor market rigidities have nuanced effects on the division of the welfare burden. Flexible hours/leave policies could provide relief to both caregivers and recipients. Lower wage gaps and shifting social norms may promote a more equitable division of care.