Financial markets regulation: political accountability challenged

A. Heritier
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Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to conceptualize and empirically illustrate the challenges that financial market regulation presents to politicians and the organization tasked with specifying regulations and supervising their implementation in the interest of users and consumers of financial instruments. It analyses the problem from the viewpoint of the governor's dilemma and the control/competence conflict, the linked problem of the rent-seeking of agents/intermediators and consumers of financial instruments. Political accountability problems are enhanced by the materiality of the technologies used, i.e. algo trading.Design/methodology/approachThe paper theoretically conceptualizes and empirically illustrates the argument.FindingsThe paper finds that regulators of digitalized financial markets are faced with considerable problems and depend on private agents when regulating financial transactions. However, the new technological instruments also offer new possibilities for securing compliance.Research limitations/implicationsFurther research should focus more in-depth on the cooperation between public and private actors in the specification and implementation of regulatory details. It should further investigate the conditions which allow regulators to use RegTech in the surveillance of financial firms.Practical implicationsSince financial market transactions are opaque for most users, the creation of more transparency is crucial to hold regulators accountable in their activity of surveillance of financial firms. New algorithm-based technologies may lend important support in doing so.Originality/valueBy linking the different analytical perspectives, i.e. the governor's dilemma vis-à-vis the intermediator or agent and the possible rent-seeking of intermediators, under the condition of a highly developed technology of financial transactions as well as the market structure, the paper offers new insights into the limits as well as new opportunities of regulating financial markets allowing for political accountability of regulators and financial firms.
金融市场监管:政治问责制受到挑战
本文旨在概念化和实证说明金融市场监管给政治家和负责指定法规并监督其实施的组织带来的挑战,以维护金融工具用户和消费者的利益。从管理者困境与控制/能力冲突、金融工具的代理人/中介和消费者的寻租问题相关联的角度分析了这一问题。所使用的技术(即算法交易)的重要性加剧了政治问责问题。这篇论文从理论上概念化了这一论点,并从经验上说明了这一论点。研究发现,数字化金融市场的监管机构在监管金融交易时面临着相当大的问题,并且依赖于私人代理。然而,新的技术手段也为确保遵守提供了新的可能性。研究限制/影响进一步的研究应更深入地关注公共和私人行为者在规范和实施监管细节方面的合作。它应该进一步调查允许监管机构在监管金融公司时使用RegTech的条件。由于金融市场交易对大多数用户来说是不透明的,因此创造更多的透明度对于监管机构在监管金融公司的活动中问责至关重要。基于算法的新技术可能在这方面提供重要支持。独创性/价值在金融交易技术和市场结构高度发达的条件下,通过将不同的分析视角,即管理者对-à-vis中介或代理人的困境和中介可能的寻租联系起来,本文为监管金融市场的限制和新的机遇提供了新的见解,允许监管机构和金融公司的政治问责。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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