Kazakhstan’s legacy of nuclear testing and its post-Soviet nuclear future

Q2 Social Sciences
Magdalena E. Stawkowski
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, an expansive arsenal of nuclear weapons was scattered across thousands of sites in newly independent states. The collapse meant that the new nations of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan inherited a total of more than 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads controlled by Russia. Amid the social, political, and economic crises that marked the early 1990s for much of the former Soviet Union, the prospect of new states possessing nuclear weapons unsettled many Western leaders. With anxieties high, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other European powers pursued nonproliferation agreements leading to complete disarmament of the three new nations. After a few years of diplomatic wrangling, the leaders of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed to move, dismantle, and destroy their inherited arsenal. As a cornerstone of this commitment, they became signatories of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in exchange for security and sovereignty assurances from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom as outlined in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. As non-nuclear-weapon-state parties to the NPT, they are prohibited from ever acquiring or manufacturing atomic weapons. But with Russia’s unprecedented invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and Vladimir Putin’s ominous nuclear threats to any country bold enough to get in Russia’s way, the issue of whether the Soviet Union’s successor states have made the right choice has been called into question in the popular media. Indeed, the most dangerous effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is that it exposes the shortcomings of the NPT—in particular, that there seem to be no real security guarantees for states that do not possess nuclear weapons when those states face existential threats from their neighbors. US foreign-policy “realists,” such as John Mearsheimer, have long argued that nuclear weapons are the best deterrent against foreign aggression. The case of Kazakhstan, however, shows something different for technological, political, and historical reasons. Holding onto the inherited cache would have meant potentially dire consequences for the newly minted nation-state as it sought to make a stable and recognized place for itself in the world. For one thing, like Belarus and Ukraine, Kazakhstan lacked the proper infrastructure, military force, and finances to maintain or even activate the inherited nuclear arsenal. In addition, Moscow had full operational command and control of its nuclear arsenal in Kazakhstan, as well as elsewhere, including the
哈萨克斯坦核试验的遗产及其后苏联核的未来
1991年苏联解体时,一个庞大的核武器库分散在新独立国家的数千个地点。崩溃意味着白俄罗斯、乌克兰和哈萨克斯坦等新国家共继承了3000多枚由俄罗斯控制的战略核弹头。在20世纪90年代初标志着前苏联大部分地区的社会、政治和经济危机中,新国家拥有核武器的前景让许多西方领导人感到不安。在高度焦虑的情况下,美国、英国和其他欧洲大国寻求达成不扩散协议,从而使这三个新国家完全解除武装。经过几年的外交争论,白俄罗斯、乌克兰和哈萨克斯坦领导人同意转移、拆除和摧毁他们继承的武器库。作为这一承诺的基石,它们签署了1968年《不扩散核武器条约》(《不扩散条约》),以换取美国、俄罗斯和联合王国在1994年《布达佩斯备忘录》中作出的安全和主权保证。作为《不扩散条约》的无核武器缔约国,它们被禁止获取或制造原子武器。但随着俄罗斯在2022年2月史无前例地入侵乌克兰,以及弗拉基米尔·普京对任何大胆阻碍俄罗斯的国家发出不祥的核威胁,苏联的继承国是否做出了正确的选择的问题在大众媒体上受到了质疑。事实上,俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略最危险的影响是,它暴露了《不扩散条约》的缺陷——尤其是,当没有核武器的国家面临邻国的生存威胁时,这些国家似乎没有真正的安全保障。约翰·米尔斯海默等美国外交政策“现实主义者”长期以来一直认为,核武器是抵御外国侵略的最佳威慑力量。然而,由于技术、政治和历史原因,哈萨克斯坦的情况有所不同。在这个新成立的民族国家寻求在世界上建立一个稳定和公认的地位时,保留继承下来的缓存将意味着潜在的可怕后果。首先,与白俄罗斯和乌克兰一样,哈萨克斯坦缺乏适当的基础设施、军事力量和财政来维持甚至激活继承的核武库。此外,莫斯科对其在哈萨克斯坦和其他地方的核武库拥有全面的作战指挥和控制权,包括
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来源期刊
Nonproliferation Review
Nonproliferation Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
0.70
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0.00%
发文量
13
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