Psychology and Obligation in Hobbes: The Case of “Ought Implies Can”

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY
Paul Garofalo
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Many interpreters use Hobbes’s endorsement of “ought implies can” to justify treating Hobbes’s motivational psychology as an external constraint on his normative theory. These interpreters assume that, for Hobbes, something is “possible” for a person to do only if they can be motivated to do it, and so Hobbes’s psychological theory constrains what obligations people have. I argue this assumption about what is “possible” is false and so these arguments are unsound. Looking to Hobbes’s exchange with Bramhall on free will, I argue that the sense of “possible” relevant for “ought implies can” in Hobbes’s philosophy only concerns an agent’s capacity to do something if they decide to do it. Whether a person can be motivated to do something, then, does not determine if it is possible for them. Consequently, Hobbes’s motivational psychology cannot determine what our obligations are by invoking the principle that “ought implies can.”
爱好中的心理学与义务——以“Ought-Implies-Can”为例
许多口译员利用霍布斯对“应该暗示可以”的认可来证明将霍布斯的动机心理学视为对其规范理论的外部约束是合理的。这些解释者认为,对霍布斯来说,只有在有动机的情况下,一个人才能“有可能”做一些事情,因此霍布斯的心理学理论限制了人们的义务。我认为这种关于什么是“可能的”的假设是错误的,因此这些论点是不合理的。看看霍布斯与布拉姆霍尔关于自由意志的交流,我认为,在霍布斯的哲学中,与“应该意味着可以”相关的“可能”感只涉及代理人在决定做某事时的能力。因此,一个人是否有动机做某事,并不能决定这对他们来说是否可能。因此,霍布斯的动机心理学不能通过援引“应该意味着可以”的原则来确定我们的义务是什么
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来源期刊
Hobbes Studies
Hobbes Studies PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
33.30%
发文量
16
期刊介绍: Hobbes Studies is an international peer reviewed scholarly journal. Its interests are twofold; first, in publishing research about the philosophical, political, historical, literary, and scientific matters related to Thomas Hobbes"s own thought, at the beginning of the modern state and the rise of science, and also in a comparison of his views to other important thinkers; second, because of Hobbes"s enduring influence in stimulating social and political theory, the journal is interested in publishing such discussions. Articles and occasional book reviews are peer reviewed. The International Hobbes Association is associated with the journal but submissions are open.
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