NIGERIA: INTERROGATING THE KINETIC AND NON-KINETIC APPROACHES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TOWARDS BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH-EAST, 2009-2015

IF 0.2 Q4 POLITICAL SCIENCE
S. Adesote, Sunday Adekunle Akande
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The fight against insurgency, terrorism, banditry, militancy, and other forms of criminality has been viewed from two major perspectives by scholars, security analysts and security experts in the existing literature. While some argued in favor of the kinetic approach, others supported the adoption of both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. The main thrust of this paper is to interrogate both the kinetic and non-kinetic approaches initiated by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan led Federal Government to placate Boko Haram terrorists in the North East geo-political zone of Nigeria between 2011 and 2015. Before the adoption of the non-kinetic approach, the government made use of a military or kinetic approach in its response to the nefarious activities of Boko Haram between 2009 and 2011. It argues that the inability of the kinetic approach to successfully address the menace of the Boko Haram insurgency forced the government to adopt a non-kinetic approach or carrot option, which took several forms such as the establishment of dialogue committees and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) agency. It submits that none of these kinetic and non-kinetic measures were able to curtail the heightened disruptive activities of the insurgent group as a result of inept political leadership, failure of good governance, problem of sabotage, lack of strong political will and commitment and so on. Keywords: Non-kinetic, government, Boko Haram, Insurgency, North-East, Nigeria.
尼日利亚:质疑联邦政府对2009-2015年东北部博科圣地叛乱的动态和非动态方法
在现有文献中,学者、安全分析师和安全专家从两个主要角度看待了打击叛乱、恐怖主义、土匪、武装分子和其他形式的犯罪的斗争。虽然一些人支持动力学方法,但另一些人支持采用动力学和非动力学方法。本文的主旨是质疑古德勒克·乔纳森博士领导的联邦政府在2011年至2015年间为安抚尼日利亚东北地缘政治区的博科圣地恐怖分子而采取的动态和非动态方法。在采取非动能方法之前,政府在2009年至2011年间对博科圣地的邪恶活动采取了军事或动能方法。它认为,能动方法无法成功应对博科圣地叛乱的威胁,迫使政府采取非能动方法或胡萝卜选项,采取了多种形式,如成立对话委员会和打击暴力极端主义机构。它认为,由于政治领导不力、善政失败、蓄意破坏问题、缺乏强有力的政治意愿和承诺等原因,这些动态和非动态措施都无法遏制叛乱团体日益猖獗的破坏活动。关键词:非动态、政府、博科圣地、叛乱、东北部、尼日利亚。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Conflict Studies Quarterly
Conflict Studies Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-
自引率
33.30%
发文量
17
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