Foreclosures and Their Costs: Could They Have Been Avoided? The Case of California during the Mortgage Crisis

IF 0.4 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Mejda Bahlous-Boldi
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The author analyzes a loan-level dataset of 1,528 defaults in California that led to sale of the property as “real estate owned” during the period from 2005 to 2017. In 898 cases (59%), lenders lost 43% of the initial loan ($89,877) on average, per foreclosure. In 942 cases (62%), borrowers lost 30% of the initial price of their home ($147,077), on average. The borrowers who ended up with a profit were those who increased their debt the most after the first purchase loan. Moreover, one in four borrowers generated an average profit of $115,856, while their lenders incurred an average loss of $93,114 precisely because excessive equity extraction transfered the downside risk to the lender. Two-thirds of all ARM borrowers defaulted within the first 3 years of the loan, implying underqualified borrowers at origination. This is an indication of predatory lending/borrowing practices that fueled the wave of foreclosures. The author finds that foreclosure discounts on REO sales in California were 35%, on average, with the highest discount appearing in 2009. Measures that prevent or limit cash-outs during a housing boom, and incentives to default during a housing bust, could help reduce foreclosures and their costs. TOPICS: MBS and residential mortgage loans, legal and regulatory issues for structured finance, financial crises and financial market history Key Findings • An analysis of 1,528 foreclosures in California shows that lenders lost $89,877 and borrowers lost $147,027, on average, per foreclosure during the 2008 mortgage crisis. One in four defaulting borrowers generated a profit, while their lenders incurred a loss due to excessive equity extraction. • ARM borrowers defaulted within the first 3 years of the loan, indicating that these borrowers were underqualified at origination. FRM borrowers defaulted later but used cash-outs more aggressively, leading to negative equity that motivated defaults during the crisis. • Foreclosure discounts were 35% in California, on average, with the worst discount occurring in 2009. Despite the volatility of HPI, every period of 12 years or longer since 1975 led to price appreciation, indicating that foreclosure should be avoided, as the recovery of the market always leads to capital gains.
取消抵押品赎回权及其成本:它们本可以避免吗?抵押贷款危机期间的加州案例
作者分析了2005年至2017年期间加州1528起违约的贷款级别数据集,这些违约导致该房产作为“拥有的房地产”出售。在898个案例中(59%),每次止赎,贷款人平均损失了43%的初始贷款(89,877美元)。在942个案例中(62%),借款人平均损失了房屋初始价格的30%(147,077美元)。最终获得利润的借款人是那些在首次购房贷款后债务增加最多的人。此外,四分之一的借款人平均获得了115,856美元的利润,而他们的贷款人平均损失了93,114美元,正是因为过度的股权提取将下行风险转移到了贷款人身上。三分之二的ARM借款人在贷款的前三年内违约,这意味着借款人在贷款开始时就不合格。这表明掠夺性贷款/借贷行为助长了止赎浪潮。作者发现,加州REO销售的止赎折扣平均为35%,最高折扣出现在2009年。在房地产繁荣时期防止或限制套现的措施,以及在房地产萧条时期鼓励违约的措施,可能有助于减少止赎及其成本。主题:MBS和住宅抵押贷款,结构性融资的法律和监管问题,金融危机和金融市场历史主要发现•对加利福尼亚州1,528次止赎的分析显示,2008年抵押贷款危机期间,贷方平均损失89,877美元,借款人平均损失147,027美元。四分之一的违约借款人实现了盈利,而他们的贷款人则因过度提取股权而蒙受亏损。•ARM借款人在贷款的前3年内违约,表明这些借款人在申请时资质不足。FRM借款人违约较晚,但更积极地使用套现,导致负资产在危机期间引发违约。•加州的止赎折扣平均为35%,折扣最严重的是2009年。尽管HPI波动很大,但自1975年以来,每12年或更长时间都会导致价格上涨,这表明应该避免止赎,因为市场的复苏总是会带来资本收益。
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来源期刊
Journal of Structured Finance
Journal of Structured Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
25.00%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The Journal of Structured Finance (JSF) is the only international, peer-reviewed journal devoted to empirical analysis and practical guidance on structured finance instruments, techniques, and strategies. JSF covers a wide range of topics including credit derivatives and synthetic securitization, secondary trading in the CDO market, securitization in emerging markets, trends in major consumer loan categories, accounting, regulatory, and tax issues in the structured finance industry.
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