Husserl’s Theory of Bodily Expressivity and its Revision: In View of the “1914 Texts”

Abstract

ABSTRACT It is well-known that Husserl denies bodily behaviour as expressive in the I. Logical Investigation but he dramatically changes his view and holds that bodily behaviour is essentially expressive in works such as Ideas II. A mainstream explanation of the change is that Husserl develops a more cogent conception of embodiment such that he can ultimately include bodily behaviour into the category of expressive phenomena. In this paper, I explore another source of this change by examining the by and large overlooked “1914 texts.” I argue that the change is significantly informed by Husserl’s revised conception of indication, such that he can offer a proper account of the intimate relation between the body and the spirit and, eventually, opt for a new view of bodily expressivity. By doing so, I also elucidate some intrinsic characteristics of bodily expressivity, such as its demand feature and its twofold unity.