The proportionality of provisional measures in ICSID arbitration

Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI:10.4337/cilj.2021.01.06
Jefferi Hamzah Sendut
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Abstract

International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals increasingly regard proportionality as a requirement for the indication of provisional measures. While proportionality's relevance to the application of substantive investment protection standards has received significant scholarly attention, less discussed is proportionality's potential impact in the provisional measures context. In light of proposals raised in the ongoing ICSID Rules Amendment Project to codify a requirement of proportionality for provisional measures, this article analyses how proportionality might be used to address State concerns regarding the effect of provisional measures on their sovereign prerogatives. It argues that the proportionality requirement's codification could meaningfully alter the approach of ICSID tribunals to provisional measures in a way which is valuable to States, but which remains fair to investors. To do so, this article outlines specifically what is meant by the ‘proportionality requirement’ in the context of the ICSID provisional measures framework, as well as the concerns which have animated State comments regarding its proposed codification in the ICSID Rules (Section 2). This article then contends that the proposed codification has the potential to meet State concerns at little cost to investors (Section 3). In order to illustrate the point, ICSID tribunals’ treatment of requests for the suspension of domestic tax enforcement is contrasted against their treatment of requests for the suspension of criminal investigations or proceedings.
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ICSID仲裁中临时措施的相称性
解决投资争端国际中心(解决投资争端中心)各法庭日益将相称性视为指示临时措施的一项必要条件。虽然相称性与实质性投资保护标准的适用的相关性得到了大量的学术关注,但较少讨论相称性在临时措施方面的潜在影响。根据正在进行的ICSID规则修订项目中提出的建议,将临时措施的相称性要求编纂成法典,本文分析了相称性如何用于解决国家对临时措施对其主权特权的影响的担忧。它认为,比例性要求的编纂可以有意义地改变ICSID法庭对临时措施的处理方式,这种方式对国家有价值,但对投资者仍然公平。为此,本文具体概述了ICSID临时措施框架背景下的“相称性要求”的含义,以及在ICSID规则(第2条)中引发国家对其拟议的编纂意见的担忧。本文随后认为,拟议的编纂有可能以投资者很少的成本满足国家关切(第3条)。为了说明这一点,ICSID法庭对暂停国内税务执法请求的处理方式与他们对暂停刑事调查或诉讼请求的处理方式形成对比。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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