Passive Cross-Holding in a Stackelberg Oligopoly

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2021-07-19 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2020-0041

Hongkun Ma, Chenhang Zeng

引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract We show that bilateral cross-holding can be profitable for firms with symmetric technologies in a Stackelberg oligopoly. Furthermore, if firms involved in cross-holding obtain a strategic advantage to be the leaders (i.e. Stackelberg leadership through cross-holding), such cross-holding will improve both consumer surplus and social welfare. We also discuss robustness of our main results with respect to convex costs and product differentiation.

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Stackelberg寡头垄断中的被动交叉持股

摘要本文证明了在Stackelberg寡头垄断中，对于技术对称的企业，双边交叉持有是有利可图的。此外，如果参与交叉持有的企业获得了成为领导者的战略优势(即通过交叉持有的Stackelberg领导)，这种交叉持有将提高消费者剩余和社会福利。我们还讨论了关于凸成本和产品差异化的主要结果的鲁棒性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.