Justification of the right to subsistence in contemporary Western philosophy: challenges and solutions

N. Shaveko
{"title":"Justification of the right to subsistence in contemporary Western philosophy: challenges and solutions","authors":"N. Shaveko","doi":"10.22363/2313-2337-2023-27-2-309-320","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses the views of modern Western philosophers on the isuue of socio-economic human rights, including the right to subsistence. The purpose of the work is to answer the question of whether the right to a decent life is morally justified. The work was carried out within the framework of the analytical approach and its inherent methodology. The author identifies several types of arguments expressed in Western literature against the right to a worthy existence. They are 1) actual impossibility of guaranteeing these rights; 2) denial of non-contractual positive obligations that could correspond to this right; 3) problematization of the imperfect nature of positive obligations corresponding to this law. It is shown that these objections in themselves are not sufficient to reject the right to a worthy existence, but they show that at the abstract level this right cannot be justified only in a “negative” sense, that is, as the right to which only the negative duties of others correspond. The author proposes to consider options for solving the problems that gave rise to discussions concerning the right to a dignified existence, outside of human rights discourse. Thus, the moral basis for the fight against poverty and other features of an “unworthy” existence can be formulated by applying to the public sphere (by analogy) the categories of civil law - condiction, tort and contract, as well as taking into account the classical conditions for the onset of legal liability. Moreover, the moral justification for securing some “decent” level of existence is achieved by referring to the general principles of fair distribution of material wealth (regardless of what is considered a “decent existence”). One of these principles is the Rawlsian principle of difference, which does not depend either on the idea of a person as a “moral agent” who requires some kind of minimum (“worthy”) level of well-being, or on understanding of the human rights nature.","PeriodicalId":32648,"journal":{"name":"RUDN Journal of Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"RUDN Journal of Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2337-2023-27-2-309-320","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The article discusses the views of modern Western philosophers on the isuue of socio-economic human rights, including the right to subsistence. The purpose of the work is to answer the question of whether the right to a decent life is morally justified. The work was carried out within the framework of the analytical approach and its inherent methodology. The author identifies several types of arguments expressed in Western literature against the right to a worthy existence. They are 1) actual impossibility of guaranteeing these rights; 2) denial of non-contractual positive obligations that could correspond to this right; 3) problematization of the imperfect nature of positive obligations corresponding to this law. It is shown that these objections in themselves are not sufficient to reject the right to a worthy existence, but they show that at the abstract level this right cannot be justified only in a “negative” sense, that is, as the right to which only the negative duties of others correspond. The author proposes to consider options for solving the problems that gave rise to discussions concerning the right to a dignified existence, outside of human rights discourse. Thus, the moral basis for the fight against poverty and other features of an “unworthy” existence can be formulated by applying to the public sphere (by analogy) the categories of civil law - condiction, tort and contract, as well as taking into account the classical conditions for the onset of legal liability. Moreover, the moral justification for securing some “decent” level of existence is achieved by referring to the general principles of fair distribution of material wealth (regardless of what is considered a “decent existence”). One of these principles is the Rawlsian principle of difference, which does not depend either on the idea of a person as a “moral agent” who requires some kind of minimum (“worthy”) level of well-being, or on understanding of the human rights nature.
当代西方哲学中生存权的正当化:挑战与对策
本文论述了现代西方哲学家对包括生存权在内的社会经济人权问题的看法。这项工作的目的是回答一个问题,即体面生活的权利是否在道德上是正当的。这项工作是在分析方法及其固有方法的框架内进行的。作者指出了西方文学中几种反对有价值的生存权的论点。这些权利在现实中不可能得到保障;2)否认可能与该权利相对应的非契约性积极义务;3)对与该法相对应的积极义务的不完善性质的质疑。本文指出,这些反对意见本身并不足以否定有价值的生存权利,但它们表明,在抽象的层面上,这种权利不能仅仅在“否定的”意义上被证明是正当的,也就是说,不能仅仅把他人的否定义务作为一种权利。作者建议考虑在人权论述之外解决引起关于有尊严的生存权的讨论的各种问题的各种办法。因此,与贫困和“不值得”存在的其他特征作斗争的道德基础可以通过(通过类比)将民法的范畴——条件、侵权和合同——应用于公共领域,以及考虑到法律责任开始的经典条件来形成。此外,确保某种“体面”生存水平的道德理由是通过参考公平分配物质财富的一般原则来实现的(不管什么被认为是“体面的存在”)。其中一个原则是罗尔斯的差异原则,它既不依赖于一个人是需要某种最低限度(“有价值的”)福利水平的“道德行为人”的观念,也不依赖于对人权本质的理解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
45
审稿时长
12 weeks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信