Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany

IF 4.6 3区 工程技术 Q2 ENERGY & FUELS
Antonios Souris, Christian Stecker, Arne Jungjohann
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Background

Transport policy has regained political relevance in Germany. The successful realization of the Verkehrswende,—the extensive transition toward sustainable transport and mobility—is central to reaching climate neutrality. In 2020, the Federal Government proposed the reform of two key ordinances that have regulated road traffic so far. The amendment was aimed at implementing several provisions at the expense of car drivers and, at the same time, in favor of cyclists and pedestrians. Due to cooperative federalism, the governments of the 16 constituent units (Länder) had to adopt the amendment in the Bundesrat, Germany’s second chamber. In the legislative process, however, the reform ultimately failed in its original scope. Using it as a particularly instructive case study, we show how and why party competition and cooperative federalism hamper comprehensive transport policy reforms in Germany.

Results

In the German political system, political interests interact within a complex web of cooperative federalism. To understand partisan encroachment on the federal decision-making processes, this paper uses a process-tracing approach. To investigate decision-making in the Bundesrat and its outcomes, the empirical analysis combines qualitative analyses of several publicly available sources. We can empirically demonstrate that political parties influenced legislative procedures. The reform failed in its original scope because the three political parties with veto power in the Bundesrat insisted on their positions and were not willing to agree on a compromise.

Conclusions

For the implementation of the Verkehrswende, the German federal system proves to be both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, the institutional design of the Bundesrat constrains extreme positions and helps promote decisions most citizens may agree with. The Länder governments and administrations can also contribute their expertise and local experience to federal legislation via the Bundesrat. On the other hand, veto powers are ubiquitous in the German system of cooperative federalism. Therefore, it is prone to blockades. The actions of the political parties in the Bundesrat have hampered the comprehensive reform of road traffic regulations that was originally envisaged. Policymaking took two steps forward toward implementing the Verkehrswende, only to immediately take one step back again.

前进两步,后退一步?德国的政党竞争、合作联邦制与交通政策改革
交通政策在德国重新获得了政治意义。成功实现向可持续交通和机动性的广泛过渡是实现气候中和的核心。2020年,联邦政府提议改革迄今为止管理道路交通的两项关键条例。该修正案旨在实施几项以牺牲汽车司机利益为代价的规定,同时有利于骑自行车和行人。由于合作联邦制,16个组成州的政府(Länder)必须在德国的第二议院联邦参议院通过修正案。然而,在立法过程中,改革最终在其最初的范围内失败了。将其作为一个特别具有指导意义的案例研究,我们展示了政党竞争和合作联邦制如何以及为什么阻碍了德国的综合交通政策改革。结果在德国的政治体制中,政治利益在一个合作联邦制的复杂网络中相互作用。为了理解党派对联邦决策过程的侵犯,本文使用了过程追踪方法。为了调查联邦参议院的决策及其结果,实证分析结合了对几个公开来源的定性分析。我们可以从经验上证明政党对立法程序的影响。由于在联邦参议院拥有否决权的三个政党坚持自己的立场,不愿意就妥协达成一致,这项改革在最初的范围内失败了。结论对于Verkehrswende的实施,德国的联邦制被证明是福也是祸。一方面,联邦参议院的制度设计限制了极端立场,有助于推动大多数公民可能同意的决策。Länder政府和行政部门也可以通过联邦参议院为联邦立法贡献他们的专业知识和地方经验。另一方面,在德国合作联邦制中,否决权无处不在。因此,它很容易被封锁。联邦参议院各政党的行动阻碍了最初设想的道路交通法规的全面改革。政策制定者在实施Verkehrswende的过程中向前走了两步,却又立即后退了一步。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Energy, Sustainability and Society
Energy, Sustainability and Society Energy-Energy Engineering and Power Technology
CiteScore
9.60
自引率
4.10%
发文量
45
审稿时长
13 weeks
期刊介绍: Energy, Sustainability and Society is a peer-reviewed open access journal published under the brand SpringerOpen. It covers topics ranging from scientific research to innovative approaches for technology implementation to analysis of economic, social and environmental impacts of sustainable energy systems.
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