Legal Environment and Contractual Choice

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2020-0098

Housi Cheng

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This paper considers contractual choice under imperfect legal systems, in particular, contracts with different timing of payment. Ex-ante payment contracts are risky for the buyer, because the seller may shirk. Ex-post payment contracts are risky for the seller, as the buyer may default. Optimal contract is solved for any given legal environment. Exchanges with lower gains from trade tend to adopt ex-post payment contracts. The seller is a better proposer than the buyer in terms of the efficiency of the proposed contract. Surprisingly, offering ex-ante payment contracts is not strictly better for the seller under any legal environment. Moreover, mixed payment contracts are also analyzed and shown to never be optimal.

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法律环境与契约选择

摘要本文研究了不完善法律制度下的合同选择，特别是不同支付时间的合同。预付款合同对买方来说是有风险的，因为卖方可能会推卸责任。事后付款合同对卖方来说是有风险的，因为买方可能违约。最优合同适用于任何给定的法律环境。交易收益较低的交易所往往采用事后支付合约。就拟议合同的效率而言，卖方是比买方更好的提议者。令人惊讶的是，在任何法律环境下，提供预付款合同对卖方来说都不是更好的选择。此外，还对混合支付合同进行了分析，并证明其从来都不是最优的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.