On Human Capital and Team Stability

IF 1.6 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Human Capital Pub Date : 2019-05-31 DOI:10.1086/702925

P. Chiappori, B. Salanié, Alfred Galichon

引用次数: 11

Abstract

In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a stable matching can be implemented with minimal policy intervention. Our results shed light on the stability of partnerships in the labor market. Moreover, they imply that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to many roommate problems.

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人力资本与团队稳定性研究

在许多经济背景下，来自同一人口的代理人会联合起来更好地利用他们的人力资本。在这种情况下(通常称为“室友匹配问题”)，即使效用是可转移的，稳定的匹配也可能不存在。我们表明，当每个个体都有一个接近的替代品时，稳定的匹配可以在最小的政策干预下实现。我们的结果揭示了劳动力市场伙伴关系的稳定性。此外，他们还暗示，在婚姻问题的实证研究中精心设计的工具可以很容易地适用于许多室友问题。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Human Capital ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Journal of Human Capital is dedicated to human capital and its expanding economic and social roles in the knowledge economy. Developed in response to the central role human capital plays in determining the production, allocation, and distribution of economic resources and in supporting long-term economic growth, JHC is a forum for theoretical and empirical work on human capital—broadly defined to include education, health, entrepreneurship, and intellectual and social capital—and related public policy analyses. JHC encompasses microeconomic, macroeconomic, and international economic perspectives on the theme of human capital. The journal offers a platform for discussion of topics ranging from education, labor, health, and family economics.