Exploiting Congestion Games to Achieve Distributed Service Chaining in NFV Networks

Abstract

The network function virtualization (NFV) paradigm has gained increasing interest in both academia and industry as it promises scalable and flexible network management and orchestration. In NFV networks, network services are provided as chains of different virtual network functions (VNFs), which are instantiated and executed on dedicated VNF-compliant servers. The problem of composing those chains is referred to as the service chain composition problem. In contrast to centralized solutions that suffer from scalability and privacy issues, in this paper, we leverage non-cooperative game theory to achieve a low-complexity distributed solution to the above-mentioned problem. Specifically, to account for selfish and competitive behavior of users, we formulate the service chain composition problem as an atomic weighted congestion game with unsplittable flows and player-specific cost functions. We show that the game possesses a weighted potential function and admits a Nash equilibrium (NE). We prove that the price of anarchy is upper-bounded, and also propose a distributed and privacy-preserving algorithm which provably converges toward an NE of the game in polynomial time. Finally, through extensive numerical results, we assess the performance of the proposed distributed solution to the service chain composition problem.