‘I Gave You More’: Discretionary Power in a Corruption Experiment

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI:10.1177/0260107919848640

Hans J. Czap, Natalia V. Czap

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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Bribes are gifts that are given with an expectation of favourable treatment from a public official or an authority figure. In some cultures, gift giving is a widely accepted part of social interaction and the rejection of gifts may be frowned upon. The purpose of this article is to investigate whether and how the (in)ability to reject gifts/bribes impacts corrupt behaviour. We present the results of an economic experiment in which two agents (firms) are competing for governmental funds. The firms may choose to bribe a public official, who is responsible for distributing the funds. We find that if there is an option to reject bribes, then the average funds allocated to the bribers are lower than in case there is no such option. This holds regardless of whether the bribe was, in fact, accepted or rejected. We also find that if the bribe was rejected, the bribers receive less governmental funds on average. Our results shed some light on the persistence of corruption in cultures in which giving gifts and expecting gifts in return is a deeply rooted custom. Prevalence of this practice in the social context spills over into the business context and leads to higher corruption levels, and more economic distortion than when bribing is just a form of business transaction. JEL: D01, D02, D73, D90

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“我给了你更多”:腐败实验中的自由裁量权

贿赂是期望从公职人员或权威人士那里得到有利待遇而给予的礼物。在某些文化中，赠送礼物是社会交往中被广泛接受的一部分，拒绝礼物可能会让人皱眉。本文的目的是调查拒绝礼物/贿赂的能力是否以及如何影响腐败行为。我们提出了一个经济实验的结果，其中两个代理人(公司)正在争夺政府资金。这些公司可能会选择贿赂负责分配资金的政府官员。我们发现，如果存在拒绝受贿的选项，那么分配给行贿者的平均资金要低于不存在拒绝受贿选项的情况。不管贿赂实际上是被接受还是被拒绝，这一点都成立。我们还发现，如果贿赂被拒绝，行贿者获得的政府资金平均较少。我们的研究结果在一定程度上揭示了在赠送礼物和期待礼物回报是一种根深蒂固的习俗的文化中腐败的持久性。与贿赂只是一种商业交易形式相比，这种行为在社会背景下的盛行蔓延到了商业环境中，导致了更高的腐败水平和更多的经济扭曲。Jel: d01, d02, d73, d90

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来源期刊

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The explosion of information and research that has taken place in recent years has had a profound effect upon a variety of existing academic disciplines giving rise to the dissolution of barriers between some, mergers between others, and the creation of entirely new fields of enquiry.