Hearing the States

A. Johnstone
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Abstract

The 2016 Presidential and Senate elections raise the possibility that a conservative, life-tenured Supreme Court will preside for years over a politically dynamic majority. This threatens to weaken the public’s already fragile confidence in the Court. By lowering the political stakes of both national elections and its own decisions, federalism may enable the Court to defuse some of the most explosive controversies it hears. Federalism offers a second-best solution, even if neither conservatives nor liberals can impose a national political agenda. However, principled federalism arguments are tricky. They are structural, more prudential than legal or empirical. Regardless of ideology, a bias toward federal power is hard-wired into the modern judicial appointment process. Once on the bench, Justices see an increasingly elite bar of Washington D.C. specialists steeped in federal practice, even when hearing cases concerning state sovereignty. These are problems for the Court, despite its likely sympathy for federalism arguments in years to come. This article suggests one solution: help the Court hear the states. Relatively minor reforms to the Court’s approach in cases impacting state sovereignty could harness the politics of state attorneys general to help the Court hear all states more clearly, facilitate a more principled federalism, and depoliticize the Court itself. States cannot help protect the Court from politicization, however, if their attorneys general fall victim to the same national polarizing forces that threaten the Court. Any reforms to help the Court hear the states better, therefore, must also help the states keep their voices strong and independent.
听取各州意见
2016年的总统和参议院选举增加了一种可能性,即一个保守的、终身任职的最高法院将主持多年的政治动态多数。这可能会削弱公众对法院本已脆弱的信心。通过降低全国选举和自己裁决的政治利害关系,联邦制可能使最高法院能够化解其审理的一些最具爆炸性的争议。联邦制提供了第二好的解决方案,即使保守派和自由派都无法强加国家政治议程。然而,有原则的联邦制论点是棘手的。它们是结构性的,比法律或经验更为谨慎。无论意识形态如何,对联邦权力的偏见都深深植根于现代司法任命过程中。法官们一坐在法官席上,就看到华盛顿特区越来越多的精英专家参与联邦实践,即使在审理涉及国家主权的案件时也是如此。这些都是最高法院面临的问题,尽管它可能会在未来几年同情联邦制的论点。这篇文章提出了一个解决方案:帮助法院听取各州的意见。对法院在影响州主权的案件中的做法进行相对较小的改革,可以利用州检察长的政治,帮助法院更清楚地听取所有州的意见,促进更有原则的联邦制,并使法院本身非政治化。然而,如果国家的总检察长成为威胁法院的国家两极分化势力的受害者,国家就无法帮助保护法院免受政治化的影响。因此,任何有助于法院更好地听取各州意见的改革,都必须有助于各州保持强大和独立的声音。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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