Can Whistleblowers Root Out Public Expenditure Fraud? Evidence from Medicare

IF 7.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Jetson Leder-Luis
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

This paper analyzes private anti-fraud enforcement under the False Claims Act, which compensates whistleblowers for litigating against healthcare providers who overbill the US government. I conduct several case studies of successful whistleblower lawsuits concerning Medicare fraud, pairing new legal data with large samples of Medicare claims. I estimate that deterrence from $1.9 billion in whistleblower settlements generated Medicare cost savings of nearly $19 billion, while imposing low costs on the government. These results suggest private enforcement is a cost-effective way to combat public expenditure fraud.
举报者能根除公共支出欺诈吗?来自医疗保险的证据
本文分析了《虚假索赔法》下的私人反欺诈执法,该法对举报人对向美国政府过度收费的医疗保健提供者提起诉讼的行为进行补偿。我对涉及医疗保险欺诈的成功举报人诉讼进行了几项案例研究,将新的法律数据与医疗保险索赔的大样本相结合。我估计,通过19亿美元的举报人和解,医疗保险成本节省了近190亿美元,同时给政府带来了低成本。这些结果表明,私人执法是打击公共支出欺诈的一种具有成本效益的方式。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
175
期刊介绍: The Review of Economics and Statistics is a 100-year-old general journal of applied (especially quantitative) economics. Edited at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Review has published some of the most important articles in empirical economics.
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