Audit Market Concentration and Audit Quality: Evidence from Analysts' Forecasts

IF 2.2 4区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Bryan G. Brockbank, Chuong Do, Bradley P. Lawson
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Audit market concentration remains a concern due to its potential impact on audit quality. We examine whether audit market concentration influences properties of analysts’ forecasts. We find that analyst forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed when audit markets are more concentrated. Consistent with regulators’ concerns, we find evidence of decreased auditor independence in concentrated markets but also increased auditor effort and a higher likelihood of a Big N auditor. This results in an overall net positive effect between audit market concentration, audit quality, and, ultimately, analysts’ forecasts. These results are concentrated in settings where analysts rely more on audited financial statements. Our findings support regulators’ concerns regarding concentration in the U.S. audit market, but also help to explain why audit market concentration leads to improved audit quality.
审计市场集中度与审计质量:来自分析师预测的证据
由于审计市场集中度对审计质量的潜在影响,它仍然是一个值得关注的问题。我们考察了审计市场集中度是否会影响分析师预测的性质。我们发现,审计市场越集中,分析师的预测越准确,分散性越低。与监管机构的担忧一致,我们发现有证据表明,在集中的市场中,审计师的独立性有所下降,但也增加了审计师的努力,并且出现大N审计师的可能性更高。这导致了审计市场集中度、审计质量以及最终分析师预测之间的整体净正效应。这些结果集中在分析师更依赖经审计财务报表的情况下。我们的研究结果支持了监管机构对美国审计市场集中度的担忧,但也有助于解释为什么审计市场集中度会导致审计质量的提高。
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来源期刊
Accounting Horizons
Accounting Horizons BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
4.00%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: Accounting Horizons is one of three association-wide journals published by the American Accounting Association AAA. This journal seeks to bridge academic and professional audiences with articles that focus on accounting, broadly defined, and that provide insights pertinent to the accounting profession. The contents of Accounting Horizons, therefore, should interest researchers, educators, practitioners, regulators, and students of accounting.
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