Hempel’s Dilemma: Not Only for Physicalism*

IF 0.7 2区哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-04-03 DOI:10.1080/02698595.2022.2041969

Erez Firt, M. Hemmo, O. Shenker

引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT According to the so-called Hempel’s Dilemma, the thesis of physicalism is either false or empty. Our intention in this paper is not to propose a solution to the Dilemma, but rather to argue as follows: to the extent that Hempel’s Dilemma applies to physicalism it equally applies to any theory that gives a deep-structure and changeable account of our experience or of high-level theories. In particular, we will show that it also applies to mind–body dualistic theories. The scope of Hempel’s Dilemma turns out to be very wide: it is a special case of a general sceptical argument against changeable deep-structure theories in and outside science.

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亨佩尔的困境：不仅仅是针对身体主义*

摘要根据所谓的亨佩尔困境，物理主义的命题要么是虚假的，要么是空洞的。我们在本文中的意图不是提出一个解决困境的方案，而是如下所述：在亨佩尔困境适用于物理主义的范围内，它同样适用于任何对我们的经验或高级理论进行深层结构和可变描述的理论。特别是，我们将证明它也适用于身心二元论。亨佩尔困境的范围非常广泛：这是一个反对科学内外可变深层结构理论的普遍怀疑论的特例。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-

自引率

12.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is a scholarly journal dedicated to publishing original research in philosophy of science and in philosophically informed history and sociology of science. Its scope includes the foundations and methodology of the natural, social, and human sciences, philosophical implications of particular scientific theories, and broader philosophical reflection on science. The editors invite contributions not only from philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, but also from researchers in the sciences. The journal publishes articles from a wide variety of countries and philosophical traditions.