The impact of lawyer fees on lawyer partisanship: the reciprocity norm may matter

Abstract

ABSTRACT Do lawyer fees influence lawyer behavior? The impact of lawyer fees on lawyer behavior has been discussed theoretically and anecdotally, mostly from an aspect of economic incentives. Yet little research has empirically examined this issue. This article aims to add one empirical study. I conducted a vignette experiment with 206 Japanese divorce lawyers. Scenarios of divorce disputes involving certain ethical dilemmas were used to measure partisanship. The description of fee arrangement in the scenarios varied to compare three conditions: (a) no specific description of lawyer fee (the control condition), (b) JPY 300 thousand retainer with additional JPY 300 thousand contingency (a typical fee arrangement in Japan), and (c) JPY 450 thousand retainer with no contingency (a lump-sum prepaid arrangement). I found that partisanship of lawyers became higher in conditions with fee descriptions, when they were conscious of (the existence of) the fee. This phenomenon was observed in condition (c) of a lump-sum prepaid fee arrangement as well as in condition (b) of a typical fee arrangement combining a retainer and contingency. The findings indicate that the reciprocity norm, rather than economic incentives, may have a power on the relationship between lawyer fees and lawyer behavior.