PRACTITIONER SUMMARY When does utilizing valuation specialists reduce auditors' litigation risk?

IF 0.8 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE
J. O. Brown, Jonathan H. Grenier, Jonathan S. Pyzoha, Andrew Reffett, Natalie Zielinski
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article summarizes "The effects of specialist type and estimate aggressiveness on juror judgments of auditor negligence" (Brown, Grenier, Pyzoha, and Reffett 2019), which examines two critical factors auditors consider when auditing complex estimates: the type of specialist to engage and the relative aggressiveness of the estimate. In an experiment involving an alleged audit failure, jurors were less likely to find auditors negligent when the auditors consulted with a valuation specialist, but only when managements' estimate was deemed to be more aggressive. The study does not find similar litigation benefits of using a specialist for a less aggressive estimate. A second experiment extended these results by demonstrating jurors were less likely to find auditors negligent when the auditors consulted with an external rather than an internal specialist, because jurors perceived external specialists as having greater independence from the client. Further, the litigation benefits of using an external specialist extended to circumstances when auditors who initially engaged an internal specialist also brought in an external specialist to review the internal specialist's work. The study concludes that utilizing external specialists, to either test management estimates or to review internal specialists' work, can limit auditors' litigation exposure, especially when auditing aggressive management estimates.
执业律师总结利用估值专家何时可以降低审计师的诉讼风险?
本文总结了“专家类型和评估攻击性对陪审员对审计师疏忽判断的影响”(Brown,Grenier,Pyzoha,and Reffett 2019),其中考察了审计师在审计复杂评估时考虑的两个关键因素:聘请的专家类型和估计的相对攻击性。在一项涉及所谓审计失败的实验中,当审计师咨询估值专家时,陪审员不太可能发现审计师疏忽大意,但只有当管理层的估计被认为更激进时。该研究没有发现使用专家进行不那么激进的估计会带来类似的诉讼效益。第二个实验扩展了这些结果,证明当审计师咨询外部专家而不是内部专家时,陪审员不太可能发现审计师疏忽大意,因为陪审员认为外部专家与客户有更大的独立性。此外,聘请外部专家的诉讼好处也适用于最初聘请内部专家的审计师也聘请外部专家审查内部专家的工作的情况。该研究得出结论,利用外部专家来测试管理层的估计或审查内部专家的工作,可以限制审计师的诉讼风险,尤其是在审计激进的管理层估计时。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Current Issues in Auditing
Current Issues in Auditing BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
19
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