Lessons from Anti-Poverty Action in Ireland: Flexibility, Failure and the Pitfalls of a ‘Fourth Branch’ Model

Abstract

This article reviews the experience of Ireland’s Combat Poverty Agency and asks what lessons it may have for fourth branch scholarship. The lesson of the Agency is, in part, one about the pitfalls for novel institutions operating within a traditional tripartite model of constitutional government. The article also suggests, however, that the Combat Poverty Agency’s history may point to the positive potential for the design and operational strategies of non-traditional bodies charged with the promotion of specific social or economic goals. In so doing some reservations about both the specific implications and overall utility of framing these bodies in ‘fourth branch’ terms are also raised. These include concerns regarding the distinctiveness and (relatedly) authority of some conceptions of a ‘fourth branch’. In particular, however, the article queries whether the elevation of independent agencies to ‘branch’ status is always beneficial; and whether, in fact, the location of anti-poverty agencies at a sub-constitutional level may, under certain conditions at least, offer advantages in terms of flexibility and practical problem-solving power.