Military electoral authoritarianism in Egypt

Abstract

Abstract This article argues that the current regime under President Abdel Fatah Sisi has established a military electoral authoritarian state with a non-dominant party electoral system. Coupled with Egypt's long tradition of nepotism, cronyism, and patronage networks, the new election laws perpetuate a fragmented, depoliticized parliament wherein no mobilized opposition can take shape to challenge the military state. The cause of Egypt's current depoliticization, however, is not a weak central party beholden to the presidency—as was the case under Sadat and Mubarak—but rather hundreds of rent-seeking parliamentarians with no party affiliation. Sisi intentionally structured the parliament to consist of over 400 individual, self-interested actors vulnerable to bribery or coercion to keep them depoliticized and compliant. This strategy facilitates purging any parliamentary figures who emerge to challenge executive power.