Banks’ Structural Power and States’ Choices on What Structurally Matters: The Geo-Economic Foundations of State Priority toward Banking in France, Germany, and Spain

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Politics & Society Pub Date : 2022-11-02 DOI:10.1177/00323292221125565

E. Massoc

引用次数: 2

Abstract

Since the 2008 financial crisis, Europe's largest banks have largely remained unchallenged. Is this because of the structural power banks continue to hold over states? This article challenges the view that states are sheer hostages of banks’ capacity to provide credit to the real economy—the conventional definition of structural power. Instead, it sheds light on the geo-economic dimension of banks’ power: key public officials conceive the position of “their own” banks in global financial markets as a crucial dimension of state power. State priority toward banking thus results from political choices as to what structurally matters most for the state. Based on a discourse analysis of parliamentary debates in France, Germany, and Spain, as well as on a comparative analysis of the implementation of a special tax on banks, this article shows that power dynamics within states largely shape political priorities toward banking at both domestic and international levels.

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银行的结构性权力和国家对结构性问题的选择:法国、德国和西班牙国家优先发展银行业的地缘经济基础

自2008年金融危机以来，欧洲最大的银行基本上没有受到挑战。这是因为结构性力量银行继续控制各州吗？这篇文章挑战了这样一种观点，即国家完全是银行向实体经济提供信贷能力的人质——这是结构性权力的传统定义。相反，它揭示了银行权力的地缘经济层面：关键公职人员将“自己的”银行在全球金融市场中的地位视为国家权力的关键层面。因此，国家对银行业的优先权来自于对国家结构最重要的政治选择。基于对法国、德国和西班牙议会辩论的话语分析，以及对银行特别税实施情况的比较分析，本文表明，国家内部的权力动态在很大程度上决定了国内外银行业的政治优先事项。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.