Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles

IF 3.3 1区 哲学 Q1 ETHICS
D. Parfit
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引用次数: 60

Abstract

Suppose we discover how we could live for a thousand years, but in a way that made us unable to have children. Everyone chooses to live these long lives. After we all die, human history ends, since there would be no future people. Would that be bad? Would we have acted wrongly? Some pessimists would answer No. These people are saddened by the suffering in most people’s lives, and they believe it would be wrong to inflict such suffering on others by having children. In earlier centuries, this bleak view was fairly plausible. But our successors would be able to prevent most human suffering. Some optimists would also answer No. These people believe that most people’s lives are worth living. But they accept two Strong Narrow Person-Affecting Principles. On the Narrow Telic Principle:
未来人、非身份问题与影响人原则
假设我们发现我们可以活一千年,但却无法生育。每个人都选择长寿。我们死后,人类历史就结束了,因为没有未来的人。那会很糟糕吗?我们会错吗?一些悲观主义者会回答“不”。这些人对大多数人生活中的痛苦感到悲伤,他们认为通过生孩子来给他人带来这种痛苦是错误的。在前几个世纪,这种悲观的观点是相当合理的。但我们的继任者将能够阻止大多数人类的苦难。一些乐观主义者也会回答“不”。这些人认为大多数人的生活都是值得的。但他们接受了两条强有力的狭义影响人原则。关于狭义Telic原则:
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
4.50%
发文量
23
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