An Experimental Investigation of Trusting Behaviour

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2022-11-22 DOI:10.3390/g13060079

Clelia Mazzoni, Patrizia Sbriglia

{"title":"An Experimental Investigation of Trusting Behaviour","authors":"Clelia Mazzoni, Patrizia Sbriglia","doi":"10.3390/g13060079","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present the results of an experiment conducted in Italy on trusting behaviour. Our subjects participated in a trust game and filled in a questionnaire on trust and trustworthiness based on the attitudinal questions reported in the European Value Survey. The aims of the research are twofold. Firstly, using the experimental dataset, we construct two measures of trustworthiness among all recipients in the experiment, one based on the questionnaires’ answers and another based on the strategy method. We then compare the ex-ante behavioural decision to trust (before participants are allocated to a group) with the ex-post decision to trust (after participants are allocated to a group and trustors are informed of the level of trustworthiness of all the recipients who have been randomly allocated to each group). Our main finding is that trust strongly varies once the information is disclosed to trustors. The effect on trust is greater when the strategy method is used. Secondly, we compare the behavioural measure of trust with the attitudinal measures of trust and trustworthiness and find that there is only a weak correlation between the two measures, thus confirming, for the Italian case, similar findings in country-based studies on trust.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"13 1","pages":"79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060079","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Abstract

In this paper, we present the results of an experiment conducted in Italy on trusting behaviour. Our subjects participated in a trust game and filled in a questionnaire on trust and trustworthiness based on the attitudinal questions reported in the European Value Survey. The aims of the research are twofold. Firstly, using the experimental dataset, we construct two measures of trustworthiness among all recipients in the experiment, one based on the questionnaires’ answers and another based on the strategy method. We then compare the ex-ante behavioural decision to trust (before participants are allocated to a group) with the ex-post decision to trust (after participants are allocated to a group and trustors are informed of the level of trustworthiness of all the recipients who have been randomly allocated to each group). Our main finding is that trust strongly varies once the information is disclosed to trustors. The effect on trust is greater when the strategy method is used. Secondly, we compare the behavioural measure of trust with the attitudinal measures of trust and trustworthiness and find that there is only a weak correlation between the two measures, thus confirming, for the Italian case, similar findings in country-based studies on trust.

查看原文本刊更多论文

信任行为的实验研究

在这篇论文中，我们介绍了在意大利进行的一项关于信任行为的实验结果。我们的受试者参加了一场信任游戏，并根据欧洲价值调查中报告的态度问题填写了一份关于信任和可信度的问卷。这项研究的目的有两个。首先，使用实验数据集，我们在实验中构建了两个受试者的可信度测度，一个基于问卷的答案，另一个基于策略方法。然后，我们将事前的信任行为决定（在参与者被分配到一个组之前）与事后的信任决定（在将参与者分配到一组之后，信任者被告知被随机分配到每个组的所有接受者的可信度水平）进行比较。我们的主要发现是，一旦信息被披露给委托人，信任度就会发生很大变化。当使用策略方法时，对信任的影响更大。其次，我们将信任的行为测量与信任和可信度的态度测量进行了比较，发现这两种测量之间只有微弱的相关性，从而证实了意大利案例中基于国家的信任研究中的类似发现。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.