What is an Identity Crisis?

IF 1.6 4区 心理学 0 PHILOSOPHY
N. Gligorov
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The use of brain technology that contributes to psychological changes has spurred a debate about personal identity. Some argue that neurotechnology does not undermine personal continuity (Levy, 2011) while others argue that it does (Kreitmair, 2019; Schechtman, 2010). To make these assessments, commentators fail to identify psychological changes that cause personal discontinuity. In this paper, I present a view that identifies personal continuity with the maintenance of a self-concept. I argue that a concept of self requires the ability to self-ascribe physical and psychological features and that the diachronic self emerges with self-ascriptions of features that require endurance over time. I maintain that an adequate concept of self does not depend on the maintenance of any particular combination of self-ascriptions and that it can be maintained despite even significant changes in psychological or physical traits. Finally, I apply the self-concept view to identify changes that can result in discontinuity of self.
什么是身份危机?
大脑技术的使用有助于心理变化,这引发了一场关于个人身份的辩论。一些人认为神经技术不会破坏个人的连续性(Levy,2011),而另一些人则认为它会破坏(Kreitmair,2019;Schechtman,2010)。为了做出这些评估,评论者没有发现导致个人不连续的心理变化。在这篇论文中,我提出了一种观点,将个人连续性与自我概念的维持联系起来。我认为,自我的概念需要自我归因于身体和心理特征的能力,而历时性的自我是随着时间的推移而产生的,需要对特征的自我归因。我坚持认为,一个适当的自我概念并不取决于维持任何特定的自我归属组合,即使心理或身体特征发生了重大变化,它也可以维持。最后,我运用自我概念的观点来识别可能导致自我不连续的变化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
58
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