Coordination of a single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain with price and green sensitive demand under stochastic lead time

Q1 Decision Sciences
A. Dash, B. Giri, A. Sarkar
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

When dealing with uncertainties in the supply chain and ensuring customer satisfaction, efficient management of lead time plays a significant role. Likewise, besides managing inventory and pricing strategies adeptly in multi-retailer supply chains, it has become inevitable for firms to embrace green and sustainable business practices. In this context, this paper considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers in which the manufacturer produces a single product and delivers it to the retailers in equal-sized batches. Each retailer faces a price and green-sensitive market demand. The lead time is assumed to be a random variable that follows a normal distribution. Shortages for retailer inventory are allowed to occur and are completely backlogged. The centralized model and a decentralized model based on the leader-follower Stackelberg gaming approach are developed. A price discount mechanism between the manufacturer and retailers is proposed. For the acceptance of this contract, the upper and lower limits of the price discount rate are established. Numerical outcomes exhibit that the price discount mechanism effectively coordinates the supply chain and enhances both environmental and economical performances. A sensitivity analysis with respect to some key parameters is performed, and certain managerial insights are emphasized.
随机提前期下具有价格和绿色敏感需求的单个制造商-多零售商供应链的协调
在处理供应链中的不确定性并确保客户满意度时,有效管理交付周期发挥着重要作用。同样,除了在多零售商供应链中熟练管理库存和定价策略外,企业不可避免地要采用绿色和可持续的商业实践。在这种背景下,本文考虑了一个由单个制造商和多个零售商组成的两级供应链,在该供应链中,制造商生产单个产品,并以同等规模的批量将其交付给零售商。每个零售商都面临着对价格和绿色敏感的市场需求。交付周期假定为一个遵循正态分布的随机变量。零售商库存的短缺是允许发生的,并且完全积压。基于领导者-追随者Stackelberg博弈方法,建立了集中式模型和去中心化模型。提出了制造商和零售商之间的价格折扣机制。为了接受本合同,确定了价格折扣率的上限和下限。数值结果表明,价格折扣机制有效地协调了供应链,提高了环境和经济性能。对一些关键参数进行了敏感性分析,并强调了某些管理见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Decision Making Applications in Management and Engineering
Decision Making Applications in Management and Engineering Decision Sciences-General Decision Sciences
CiteScore
14.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
35
审稿时长
14 weeks
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