CRITICAL INJUSTICE

IF 0.8 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI:10.2307/48570843

Allan Hazlett

引用次数: 1

Abstract

In this paper I examine unjust deficits of criticism, or what I call cases of “critical injustice.” In paradigm cases of testimonial injustice, prejudice leads one person to give insufficient credibility to another. In paradigm cases of critical injustice, prejudice leads one person to offer insufficient criticism of another. Here I articulate the concept of critical injustice and give an explanation of why it is a species of injustice. I also describe a non-prejudicial species of critical injustice and discuss a possible tension between the goal of preventing testimonial injustice and the goal of preventing critical injustice.

查看原文本刊更多论文

关键不公正

在本文中，我研究了批评的不公正缺陷，或者我称之为“批判性不公正”的案例。在证词不公正的典型案例中，偏见导致一个人对另一个人的可信度不足。在批判性不公正的范例案例中，偏见导致一个人对另一个人的批评不足。在这里，我阐明了批判性不公正的概念，并解释了为什么它是一种不公正。我还描述了一种非偏见的批判性不公正，并讨论了防止证词不公正的目标与防止批判性不公正的目标之间可能存在的紧张关系。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Since its inauguration in 1964, the American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ) has established itself as one of the principal English vehicles for the publication of scholarly work in philosophy. The whole of each issue—printed in a large-page, double-column format—is given to substantial articles; from time to time there are also "state of the art" surveys of recent work on particular topics. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality, regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.