Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions

IF 1.3 4区社会学 Q3 SOCIOLOGY

Rationality and Society Pub Date : 2021-03-24 DOI:10.1177/10434631211001576

R. Nieva

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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We have explained the presence of heterogeneous winning coalitions in social revolutions. In an overcrowded agrarian society, two almost identical non-productive enforcers, the landed political elite, collude and bargain over transfers with one of the two peasants to contest over a piece of land, as property rights for land are not well defined. In any other scenario, neither the grand coalition nor the coalition of two peasants and one enforcer forms, thereby deposing the other enforcer with positive probability. So, social revolutions never occur. If foreign wars weaken an enforcer, such as in China (1911), France, and Russia, adding one unit of capital makes the coalition of the peasant, the now worker, and one of the enforcers (now an industrial political elite) attractive: The excess labor can work with it; the weaker enforcer retaliates less and the stronger one more, if excluded. However, if the weaker one (the still-landed political elite) proposes first, a grand coalition forms in which he or she gets less than the other members do (desertion). There is conflict among peasants and among landed elites; thus, the concept of a coalition is more appropriate than that of a class.

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异质联盟与社会革命

我们已经解释了在社会革命中存在的异质性获胜联盟。在一个过度拥挤的农业社会中，两个几乎完全相同的非生产性执行者，即土地政治精英，与两名农民中的一名串通并讨价还价，争夺一块土地，因为土地的产权没有得到很好的界定。在任何其他情况下，无论是大联盟还是两个农民和一个执行者的联盟，都不会形成，从而以正概率罢免另一个执行器。因此，社会革命从未发生过。如果外国战争削弱了一个执行者，比如在中国（1911年）、法国和俄罗斯，增加一个单位的资本会使农民、现在的工人和执行者之一（现在的工业政治精英）的联盟具有吸引力：多余的劳动力可以与之合作；如果被排除在外，实力较弱的执法者报复更少，实力较强的执法者更多。然而，如果较弱的一方（仍有土地的政治精英）首先提出，就会形成一个大联盟，在这个联盟中，他或她得到的比其他成员少（逃兵）。农民和土地精英之间存在冲突；因此，联盟的概念比阶级的概念更合适。

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来源期刊

Rationality and Society SOCIOLOGY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Rationality & Society focuses on the growing contributions of rational-action based theory, and the questions and controversies surrounding this growth. Why Choose Rationality and Society? The trend toward ever-greater specialization in many areas of intellectual life has lead to fragmentation that deprives scholars of the ability to communicate even in closely adjoining fields. The emergence of the rational action paradigm as the inter-lingua of the social sciences is a remarkable exception to this trend. It is the one paradigm that offers the promise of bringing greater theoretical unity across disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, cognitive psychology, moral philosophy and law.