{"title":"SOCRATES ON POETRY AND THE WISDOM OF SIMONIDES","authors":"D. Futter","doi":"10.7445/65-0-1023","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In books 2 and 3 of the Republic, Socrates criticizes Homer and Hesiod for telling the greatest falsehoods about the greatest things; in book 1, he assumes that Simonides is a ‘wise and blessed’ bard who knows the truth. Socrates’ position on the authority of poets seems contradictory. Can this tension be resolved? I argue that it can be. Building on but revising Nicholas Pappas’ suggestion that Socrates’ charity in interpreting poetry is a form of disrespect, I show that the contradiction in his position is not in principle but in use. Socrates assumes that a true poet must be a knower of the good; however, in book 1, he uses this assumption to absolve Simonides from error, whereas in books 2 and 3, he infers that Homer, Hesiod, and other lesser figures are not true poets. This difference in use is to be explained by changes in interlocutors and a material concern with early childhood education.","PeriodicalId":40864,"journal":{"name":"Akroterion-Journal for the Classics in South Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Akroterion-Journal for the Classics in South Africa","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7445/65-0-1023","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"CLASSICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In books 2 and 3 of the Republic, Socrates criticizes Homer and Hesiod for telling the greatest falsehoods about the greatest things; in book 1, he assumes that Simonides is a ‘wise and blessed’ bard who knows the truth. Socrates’ position on the authority of poets seems contradictory. Can this tension be resolved? I argue that it can be. Building on but revising Nicholas Pappas’ suggestion that Socrates’ charity in interpreting poetry is a form of disrespect, I show that the contradiction in his position is not in principle but in use. Socrates assumes that a true poet must be a knower of the good; however, in book 1, he uses this assumption to absolve Simonides from error, whereas in books 2 and 3, he infers that Homer, Hesiod, and other lesser figures are not true poets. This difference in use is to be explained by changes in interlocutors and a material concern with early childhood education.