Self-interest, transitional cosmopolitanism and the motivational problem

IF 1.1 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE
G. Brown, Joshua Hobbs
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

It is often argued that cosmopolitanism faces unique motivational constraints, asking more of individuals than they are able to give. This ‘motivational problem’ is held to pose a significant challenge to cosmopolitanism, as it appears unable to transform its moral demands into motivated political action. This article develops a novel response to the motivational problem facing cosmopolitanism, arguing that self-interest, alongside appeals to sentiment, can play a vital and neglected, transitional role in moving towards an expanded cosmopolitical condition. The article explicates the ‘motivational problem’, analyses the relationship between self-interest and sentimental cosmopolitanism in addressing it, and develops a series of claims that self-interest can be one important component in what we label as ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’. In doing so, we argue that self-interested motivations can be compatible with sentiment-based approaches, rendering them more plausible. In addition, two expected critiques of self-interested ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’ are tackled: (A) That it cannot address feasibility constraints, and (B) That self-interested motivations cannot meet what an ‘authentic’ cosmopolitanism entails. We refute and challenge these critiques and outline three conditions in which self-interest can advance a transitional form of cosmopolitanism, while also being compatible with cosmopolitanism writ large.
自我利益,过渡世界主义和动机问题
人们经常认为,世界主义面临着独特的动机约束,对个人的要求超出了他们的能力。这个“动机问题”被认为是对世界主义的重大挑战,因为它似乎无法将其道德要求转化为有动机的政治行动。这篇文章对世界主义面临的动机问题做出了新颖的回应,认为利己主义与情感诉求一起,可以在走向扩大的世界主义政治条件中发挥重要而被忽视的过渡作用。本文阐述了“动机问题”,分析了利己主义和情感世界主义之间的关系,并提出了一系列主张,即利己主义可以成为我们所称的“过渡世界主义”的重要组成部分。在这样做的过程中,我们认为自利动机可以与基于情绪的方法相兼容,使其更可信。此外,还讨论了对自利的“过渡世界主义”的两种预期批评:(A)它不能解决可行性限制,以及(B)自利的动机不能满足“真正的”世界主义的要求。我们反驳和挑战这些批评,并概述了三个条件,在这些条件下,利己主义可以推进世界主义的过渡形式,同时也与世界主义兼容。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
11
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