The impact of executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes on voluntary disclosures: Does audit quality matter?

IF 3.9 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Praveen Kumar
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

PurposeThis article investigated whether the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demands for higher corporate voluntary disclosures. Moreover, the study also examined the moderating role of the auditor's reputation in the direction of association among executive compensation, corporate governance attributes, and voluntary disclosures.Design/methodology/approachThe study used a sample of S&P BSE index constituents' 90 Indian firms for 2017–2019. The voluntary disclosure scores were fetched from the India Disclosure Index Report published by FTI Consulting. This analysis was carried out in two parts by applying four panel-data regression models in the agency and signalling theories framework. First, the study examined the association between executive compensation, board strength, composition, gender diversity, and voluntary disclosures. Second, the article investigated the moderating role of the “Big 4” in the direction of association among executive compensation, corporate governance attributes, and voluntary disclosures.FindingsThe willingness of executives to share private information with stakeholders depends on the compensation they receive from their employer. The higher compensation paid to executives leads to a higher “tone from the top,” which is better aligned with stakeholder interests. Further, the research also found that bigger board sizes, a higher proportion of independent and woman directors (indicators of good governance), and an auditor's reputation are associated with increased voluntary disclosure.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings showed that the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demand for higher voluntary information from firms. Moreover, the study also found that the “Big 4” play a moderating role in this direction. The choice of a reputed auditor indicates the firms' long-term positive future perspectives, which strengthens investor confidence in the financial market.Practical implicationsThe study suggests that fair executive compensation can address the agency problem.Originality/valueThis research furnishes managers and different stakeholders with significant implications of executives' compensation, corporate governance, and auditor's reputation in the best interests of a firm through reducing potential risks of information asymmetry.
高管薪酬和公司治理属性对自愿披露的影响:审计质量重要吗?
目的研究高管薪酬和公司治理属性是否与利益相关者要求提高公司自愿披露的要求相一致。此外,研究还考察了审计师声誉在高管薪酬、公司治理属性和自愿披露之间的关联方向上的调节作用。该研究使用了标准普尔BSE指数成分股2017-2019年的90家印度公司的样本。自愿信息披露得分来自FTI咨询公司发布的《印度信息披露指数报告》。本文采用代理和信号理论框架下的四个面板数据回归模型,分两部分进行分析。首先,该研究考察了高管薪酬、董事会实力、构成、性别多样性和自愿披露之间的关系。其次,本文考察了“四大”在高管薪酬、公司治理属性和自愿披露之间关联方向上的调节作用。高管与利益相关者分享私人信息的意愿取决于他们从雇主那里获得的薪酬。支付给高管的更高薪酬会带来更高的“高层基调”,这更符合利益相关者的利益。此外,研究还发现,更大的董事会规模、更高比例的独立董事和女性董事(良好治理的指标)以及审计师的声誉与自愿披露的增加有关。研究局限/启示研究发现,高管薪酬和公司治理属性与利益相关者对公司自愿信息的更高要求是一致的。此外,研究还发现,“四大”在这一方向上发挥了调节作用。选择知名的审计机构表明了公司对未来的长期积极展望,这增强了投资者对金融市场的信心。实践启示研究表明,公平的高管薪酬可以解决代理问题。原创性/价值本研究通过降低信息不对称的潜在风险,为管理者和不同利益相关者提供了高管薪酬、公司治理和审计师声誉在公司最佳利益中的重要启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
13.30%
发文量
44
期刊介绍: The Journal of Applied Accounting Research provides a forum for the publication of high quality manuscripts concerning issues relevant to the practice of accounting in a wide variety of contexts. The journal seeks to promote a research agenda that allows academics and practitioners to work together to provide sustainable outcomes in a practice setting. The journal is keen to encourage academic research articles which develop a forum for the discussion of real, practical problems and provide the expertise to allow solutions to these problems to be formed, while also contributing to our theoretical understanding of such issues.
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