Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
R. Scott Smith
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract Many have written about trope ontology, but relatively few have considered its implications for some of the ontological conditions needed for us to have knowledge. I explore the resources of trope ontology to meet those conditions. With J. P. Moreland, I argue that, being simple, we can eliminate tropes’ qualitative contents without ontological loss, resulting in bare individuators. Then I extend Moreland’s argument, arguing that tropes undermine some of the needed ontological conditions for knowledge. Yet, we do know many things, and trope nominalists presuppose that too. Therefore, I consider three counter-arguments, starting with David Lewis’s rebuttal based on appeal to brute facts. Second, I explore Jeffrey Brower’s recent proposal as a possible solution. Last, I consider Robert Garcia’s recent distinction between module and modifier tropes, to see if it can be of assistance. I conclude, however, that trope nominalism cannot preserve some of the needed ontology to have knowledge.
比喻和知识的一些本体论前提
摘要许多人都写过比喻本体论,但相对较少的人考虑过它对我们获得知识所需的一些本体论条件的影响。为了满足这些条件,我探索了比喻本体论的资源。与J·P·莫兰德一起,我认为,简单地说,我们可以在不损失本体论的情况下消除比喻的定性内容,从而产生裸露的个体。然后,我扩展了莫兰德的论点,认为比喻破坏了知识所需的一些本体论条件。然而,我们确实知道很多事情,而比喻唯名论者也预设了这一点。因此,我考虑了三个反驳,首先是大卫·刘易斯基于对残酷事实的上诉进行的反驳。其次,我探讨了Jeffrey Brower最近提出的一个可能的解决方案。最后,我考虑一下Robert Garcia最近对模块和修饰语比喻的区分,看看它是否有帮助。然而,我的结论是,比喻唯名论不能保留一些拥有知识所需的本体论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
29
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