The World’s Most Prestigious Prize: The Inside Story of the Nobel Peace Prize

IF 0.3 3区 社会学 Q2 HISTORY
H. Nehring
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Second, the author points out that well aware of the risks of nuclear escalation and using nuclear weapons, Kennedy and Khrushchev were determined to keep American and Soviet military forces under tight control and managed to do so. Third, The Silent Guns emphasises that the extremely cautious behaviours of numerous civilian and military lower rank officials on both sides contributed to avoiding a nuclear war. Based on this analysis, the author observes, ‘the Cold War environment of October 1962 proved to be a surprisingly safe period’ [268]. However, this reviewer wonders if Kennedy was ready to allow the Soviets to take over Berlin. His political stakes in the city were much higher than in Turkey. Nevertheless, Kennedy wanted to avoid a straightforward trade between Cuba and Turkey. Indeed, for him, even the concession over Turkey had to be secret or made under a diplomatic cover like the Cordier ploy to minimise damage to domestic and alliance politics. Vorhees might have reached different conclusions if he had examined Kennedy’s concern over Berlin in the wider historical context of the Berlin crisis. In addition, there seems to be some room for debate regarding the stability of the Cold War system in October 1962. Certainly, the self-restraint of the actors involved in the missile crisis, especially those at lower levels, contributed to the absence of a nuclear catastrophe. However, this does not completely rule out the possibility of what Dean Acheson called ‘plain dumb luck’ averting nuclear war. Nevertheless, The Silent Guns offers some new findings and stimulating arguments on the nexus between domestic politics and diplomacy, the inner workings of the backchannel diplomacy between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Kennedy’s fallback to avoid nuclear war, and the problem of how close the Cuban crisis came to nuclear apocalypse. With these insights, the book contributes to further understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
世界上最著名的奖项:诺贝尔和平奖的内幕
其次,作者指出,肯尼迪和赫鲁晓夫深知核升级和使用核武器的风险,决心严格控制美苏军事力量,并设法做到了这一点。第三,《无声的枪》强调,双方众多文职和低级军官极其谨慎的行为有助于避免核战争。基于这一分析,作者观察到,“1962年10月的冷战环境被证明是一个令人惊讶的安全时期”[268]。然而,这位评论家怀疑肯尼迪是否准备好让苏联人占领柏林。他在这座城市的政治赌注比在土耳其要高得多。然而,肯尼迪希望避免古巴和土耳其之间的直接贸易。事实上,对他来说,即使是对土耳其的让步也必须是秘密的,或者是在外交掩护下做出的,就像科迪尔的策略一样,以尽量减少对国内和联盟政治的损害。如果沃尔希斯把肯尼迪对柏林危机的关注放在更大的历史背景下考察,他可能会得出不同的结论。此外,关于1962年10月冷战体制的稳定性似乎还有一些辩论的余地。当然,参与导弹危机的行为者的自我克制,特别是那些较低级别的行为者的自我克制,有助于避免核灾难的发生。然而,这并不能完全排除迪恩·艾奇逊所说的“纯粹的愚蠢运气”避免核战争的可能性。然而,《无声的枪炮》在国内政治与外交之间的关系、肯尼迪与赫鲁晓夫之间秘密外交的内部运作、肯尼迪为避免核战争而做出的退让,以及古巴危机离核灾难有多近的问题上,提供了一些新的发现,并引发了激烈的争论。有了这些见解,本书有助于进一步了解古巴导弹危机。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
37
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