Inertia and Reactiveness in Germany's Russia Policy

IF 0.5 Q3 AREA STUDIES
Jonas J. Driedger
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Despite signs that Russia was preparing an invasion of Ukraine, the newly elected German government stayed with pre-existing approaches that involved engagement and the threat of limited sanctions. However, in February 2022, just before the invasion began, Germany blocked the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system, announced weapon deliveries to Ukraine, and massively increased defense spending. This article shows that inertia and reactiveness heavily influenced the timing, nature, and extent of this massive shift in Germany's Russia policy. German leaders continued the existing policy in part because it had been formed by still influential figures and was in line with societal views. However, at the dawn of the invasion, the failure of previous policies had become undeniable, pressure from Ukraine and nato allies peaked, and societal views finally shifted. Reacting to this untenable situation, key figures in the German elite pushed through a series of measures that nato allies and Ukraine had long demanded.
德国对俄政策的惰性与反应性
尽管有迹象表明,俄罗斯正准备入侵乌克兰,但新当选的德国政府仍坚持原有的做法,包括接触和威胁进行有限的制裁。然而,在2022年2月,就在入侵开始之前,德国封锁了北溪2号管道系统,宣布向乌克兰运送武器,并大幅增加国防开支。本文表明,惰性和反动性在很大程度上影响了德国对俄政策转变的时机、性质和程度。德国领导人继续实行现行政策,部分原因是它是由仍然有影响力的人物制定的,符合社会观点。然而,在入侵之初,先前政策的失败已成为不可否认的事实,来自乌克兰和北约盟国的压力达到顶峰,社会观点最终发生了转变。为了应对这种难以为继的局面,德国精英中的关键人物推动了北约盟国和乌克兰长期以来一直要求的一系列措施。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
19
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