MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION MODEL WITH ENTRANCE FEE

Q3 Mathematics
O. Tilzo
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study the monopolistic competition model with producer-retailer-consumers two-level interaction. The industry is organized according to the Dixit–Stiglitz model. The retailer is the only monopolist. A quadratic utility function represents consumer preferences. We consider the case of the retailer's leadership; namely, we study two types of behavior: with and without the free entry condition. Earlier, we obtained the result: to increase social welfare and/or consumer surplus, the government needs to subsidize (not tax!) retailers. In the presented paper, we develop these results for the situation when the producer imposes an entrance fee for retailers.
具有入场费的垄断竞争模型
我们研究了生产者-零售商-消费者两级互动的垄断竞争模型。该行业是根据Dixit–Stiglitz模型组织的。零售商是唯一的垄断者。二次效用函数代表消费者偏好。我们考虑零售商领导层的情况;即,我们研究了两种类型的行为:有自由进入条件和没有自由进入条件。早些时候,我们得出的结果是:为了增加社会福利和/或消费者盈余,政府需要补贴(而不是税收!)零售商。在本文中,我们针对生产者向零售商收取入场费的情况发展了这些结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Ural Mathematical Journal
Ural Mathematical Journal Mathematics-Mathematics (all)
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
12
审稿时长
16 weeks
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