{"title":"A code-based hybrid signcryption scheme","authors":"Jean Belo Klamti, M. Hasan","doi":"10.36227/techrxiv.17283899.v1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A key encapsulation mechanism ( KEM {\\mathsf{KEM}} ) that takes as input an arbitrary string, i.e., a tag, is known as tag- KEM {\\mathsf{KEM}} , while a scheme that combines signature and encryption is called signcryption. In this article, we present a code-based signcryption tag- KEM {\\mathsf{KEM}} scheme. We utilize a code-based signature and an IND - CCA2 {\\mathsf{IND}}\\hspace{0.1em}\\text{-}\\hspace{0.1em}{\\mathsf{CCA2}} (adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) secure version of McEliece’s encryption scheme. The proposed scheme uses an equivalent subcode as a public code for the receiver, making the NP-completeness of the subcode equivalence problem be one of our main security assumptions. We then base the signcryption tag- KEM {\\mathsf{KEM}} to design a code-based hybrid signcryption scheme. A hybrid scheme deploys asymmetric- as well as symmetric-key encryption. We give security analyses of both our schemes in the standard model and prove that they are secure against IND - CCA2 {\\mathsf{IND}}\\hspace{0.1em}\\text{-}\\hspace{0.1em}{\\mathsf{CCA2}} (indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) and SUF - CMA {\\mathsf{SUF}}\\hspace{0.1em}\\text{-}\\hspace{0.1em}{\\mathsf{CMA}} (strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack).","PeriodicalId":43866,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Cryptology","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Mathematical Cryptology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.17283899.v1","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract A key encapsulation mechanism ( KEM {\mathsf{KEM}} ) that takes as input an arbitrary string, i.e., a tag, is known as tag- KEM {\mathsf{KEM}} , while a scheme that combines signature and encryption is called signcryption. In this article, we present a code-based signcryption tag- KEM {\mathsf{KEM}} scheme. We utilize a code-based signature and an IND - CCA2 {\mathsf{IND}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CCA2}} (adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) secure version of McEliece’s encryption scheme. The proposed scheme uses an equivalent subcode as a public code for the receiver, making the NP-completeness of the subcode equivalence problem be one of our main security assumptions. We then base the signcryption tag- KEM {\mathsf{KEM}} to design a code-based hybrid signcryption scheme. A hybrid scheme deploys asymmetric- as well as symmetric-key encryption. We give security analyses of both our schemes in the standard model and prove that they are secure against IND - CCA2 {\mathsf{IND}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CCA2}} (indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) and SUF - CMA {\mathsf{SUF}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CMA}} (strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack).