{"title":"China’s Westward March : Strategic Views of One Belt, One Road","authors":"Cha-seuk Cha","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2017.12.15.3.483","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The New Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, ‘One Belt, One Road ( 一帶一路 , OBOR) initiative, were proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. OBOR are plans to draw down $50 billion from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), use a $40 billion New Silk Road Fund, and borrow from the New Development Bank established by the BRICS states. The geographical linkage envisaged by the OBOR is based on building on the existing and planned global linkages between various regions and local points on the Eurasian continent. The OBOR is an overt expression of China’s power ambition in the 21st century, aiming to refashion the global geopolitical landscape, although it is true that the OBOR was initially motivated by domestic economic development goals. The OBOR bears a close resemblance to US foreign policy before and after the US rose to being a superpower after WWII. China’s recent efforts at amending its foreign policy ( 周邊外交 ) are very much related to this point. It is embodied in con-ceptualization of ‘a community of common destiny,’ and the four basic principles of the foreign policy as friendship ( 親 ), faithfulness ( 誠 ), benefits ( 惠 ), and tolerance ( 容 ). The approach reminds us of an imperial way of state’s strategy. North Korea would be an obstacle if South Korea were engaged in the OBOR initiative, which would work against its own Eurasia Initiative. During the time it is worth questioning the extent to which South Korea has managed to frame its participation in the OBOR under the shadow of the US-South Korea alliance.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"483-500"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Korean Journal of International Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2017.12.15.3.483","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
The New Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, ‘One Belt, One Road ( 一帶一路 , OBOR) initiative, were proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. OBOR are plans to draw down $50 billion from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), use a $40 billion New Silk Road Fund, and borrow from the New Development Bank established by the BRICS states. The geographical linkage envisaged by the OBOR is based on building on the existing and planned global linkages between various regions and local points on the Eurasian continent. The OBOR is an overt expression of China’s power ambition in the 21st century, aiming to refashion the global geopolitical landscape, although it is true that the OBOR was initially motivated by domestic economic development goals. The OBOR bears a close resemblance to US foreign policy before and after the US rose to being a superpower after WWII. China’s recent efforts at amending its foreign policy ( 周邊外交 ) are very much related to this point. It is embodied in con-ceptualization of ‘a community of common destiny,’ and the four basic principles of the foreign policy as friendship ( 親 ), faithfulness ( 誠 ), benefits ( 惠 ), and tolerance ( 容 ). The approach reminds us of an imperial way of state’s strategy. North Korea would be an obstacle if South Korea were engaged in the OBOR initiative, which would work against its own Eurasia Initiative. During the time it is worth questioning the extent to which South Korea has managed to frame its participation in the OBOR under the shadow of the US-South Korea alliance.